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3Decision Making and Stated Preference Techniques:
New Challenges to Old Assumptions
Abstract
Stated preference techniques originate from the field of experimental economics and
rely heavily upon the assumptions of economic rationality and utility maximisation.
Several high profile failures of the technique, and limited research evidence pointing
at differences in the way in which individuals respond to different ways of
representing attributes in stated preference experiments, suggest that these
assumptions should be re-evaluated.   This paper challenges the traditional
assumptions held about decision making by stated preference practitioners, drawing
on contrasting decision making literature from the psychology field.  A possible
explanation for the varying responses to different attribute representations is
provided in a model of decision making derived from this literature.
1. Introduction
Stated preference (SP) techniques are a family of market research tools that allow
researchers to uncover how consumers value different product/service attributes.
SP asks respondents to rank, rate or choose between different hypothetical
product/service scenarios,  that are made up of different attribute mixes.  The
choices made by the respondents can be used to infer how they value different
attributes.
This paper questions the assumptions made about the decision making process of
respondents in stated preference techniques, drawing from limited evidence from SP
research as well as literature from the psychology field, in order to develop a new
alternative model of decision making in stated preference experiments.
This paper is separated into three distinct parts.   Firstly, the origins and
development of SP will be discussed.  A presentation of the historical background to
the technique is important in explaining the assumptions widely held by stated
4preference practitioners today.  Furthermore this section highlights some recent SP
literature that questions our understanding of the decision making process.
Secondly, the paper discusses different theories of decision making, in particular the
contrasting assumptions made by users of SP and those in literature from the
Psychology field.  Thirdly, this paper presents a theoretical model of decision
making in stated preference techniques, and suggests two areas where research
needs to be carried out in order to test this model.
2. Historical Development of Stated Preference Techniques
This section describes the origins of stated preference techniques in order to explain
the reasons for the assumptions about decision making that are held by stated
preference practitioners.
Whilst SP is now often labelled a market research tool, it is within the field of utility
theory and demand forecasting that the technique has evolved.  This section
provides a brief historical outline of the key developments in this area. It begins
with the early research into utility theory carried out within the fields of
mathematical psychology and microeconomics, that has led to the development of
the forecasting techniques of revealed and stated preference techniques.
Applications within the transport field are included within the discussion.
Experiments Concerning Individual Choice
The origins of utility theory can be traced to the philosophy of utilitarianism dating
back to Jeremy Bentham in 1789 (Hargreaves Heap, 1992).  Bentham’s concept of
utility was defined in hedonic terms, by the pleasure that it produces (Kahneman,
1994).  Others have interpreted utility as ‘wantability’ (Fisher, 1918).  Kahneman
(1994) suggests that:
‘Economic analysis is more congenial to wants and preferences than to hedonic
experiences, and the current meaning of utility in economics and decision research is
a positivistic version of wantability: utility is a theoretical construct inferred from
observed choices.’
5Researchers working within the field of utility theory were by the first half of this
century trying to find ways of measuring an individual’s utility measure for goods
and services, and so determine consumer preferences.
In 1931 Thurstone carried out research into how to determine individuals’
indifference curves.  Indifference curves show combinations of goods that provide a
consumer with equal utility.  He reported an experiment where individuals were
asked to make hypothetical choices about different commodity bundles that
consisted of hats and coats, hats and shoes, or shoes and coats.  Thurstone reported
in detail the responses of one individual, and concluded that the trade-offs made
could be adequately represented by indifference curves.
Thurstone’s experiment was strongly criticised by Wallis and Friedman (1942).
They stated:
‘It is questionable whether a subject in so artificial an experimental situation could
know what choices he would make in an economic situation; not knowing, it is
almost inevitable that he would, in entire good faith, systemise his answers in such a
way as to produce plausible but spurious results… .. for a satisfactory experiment it
is essential that the subject give actual reactions to actual stimuli…  Questionnaires
or other devices based on conjectural responses to hypothetical stimuli do not satisfy
this requirement.  The responses are valueless because the subject cannot know how
he would react’.
Rousseas and Hart (1951) described an experiment that they carried out as a
response to the work reported by Thurstone, and the subsequent criticism made by
Wallis and Friedman.  They aimed to carry out a choice experiment that provided a
more realistic choice situation by asking individuals to choose between different
breakfast menus.  Whilst the experiment was carried out in a different way to that of
Thurstone’s, Rousseas and Hart concluded that individual’s preferences could be
successfully measured using hypothetical choice experiments.
This conclusion was supported by research carried out by Mosteller and Nogee
(1951) that looked at expected utility theory.  They suggested that laboratory
6experimentation can provide a valuable opportunity to examine behaviour that is
‘unconfounded by other considerations’.
Despite the descriptions above of early experiments using hypothetical choice,
criticisms by economists about the validity of hypothetical choice (such as those
made by Wallis and Friedman), meant that most research has relied upon observed
choices or revealed preference data.
7Revealed Preference Theory
The term revealed preference is first attributed to Samuelson (1938).  He suggested
that an individual’s behaviour could be seen as a series of choices. By comparing
observed behaviour with available alternatives, Samuelson suggests that an
individual’s preferences (or utility function) are inferred. This theory has been
subsequently developed in order to allow choice models to be estimated. Revealed
preference data is gathered either through direct observation, or in surveys asking
about actual behaviour.  McFadden (1973) provides a more detailed discussion of
the technique.
Research into transport demand modelling has been at the forefront of the
development of revealed preference choice models.  Published examples within this
context can be found by Warner (1962), Lisco (1967), and Quarmby (1967).
The Limitations of Revealed Preference Techniques (RP)
Whilst RP data has been used frequently to forecast travel demand, the technique
exhibits a number of severe limitations:
· It can be difficult to observe the effect of sufficiently large variations in the variables
of interest using revealed preference data.  For example, transport operators would
be unlikely to experiment widely with their fare levels in order to assess consumers’
reactions.  Similarly, an operator would not want to commit large sums investing in
upgrading services in order to gain a greater understanding of consumer
preferences.  Hence revealed preference data is typically restricted in the width of
variation of current or past service attribute levels.  As a result, researchers can only
calculate accurately a small section of a consumer utility function.
 
· There are often strong correlations between the variables (multicollinearity) in
revealed preference data (in particular travel time and cost).  Separating out the
effect of different variables can be difficult, making estimation of the model
parameters impossible.
 
8· It can be difficult to estimate utility levels attributed to secondary variables (for
example, seat design), as opposed to primary variables (for example travel time and
cost), using revealed preference data.  This is because the relative utility weighting
for secondary variables is low.
 
· Given that revealed preference data is based on actual behaviour, the use of these
techniques proves difficult when forecasting demand for new services.
Clearly, the use of revealed preference techniques for forecasting demand can, in
many scenarios prove difficult. It is largely as a result of the problems encountered
using RP techniques that researchers looked for new methods of estimating
consumer utility functions, and so forecast demand.
Stated Preference Techniques (SP)
Experiments using hypothetical choice were used in the first half of this century, as
discussed earlier, in order to develop a greater understanding of utility theory.
However, this alternative method for observing consumer preferences was not
developed in the field of market research, for commercial application, until the early
1970s.  Early examples of experiments that used these hypothetical scenarios, then
commonly referred to as ‘conjoint analysis’, can be found by Davidson (1973) and
Louviere (1973).
In 1978, Green and Srinivasen formally defined these kinds of evaluation techniques
as:
‘Any decompositional method that estimates the structure of a consumer’s
preference........ given his/her overall evaluation of a set of alternatives that are
pre-specified in terms of levels of different attributes’
From the early 1980s researchers in the transport field were using the method, and
within Europe at least were referring to the method as ‘stated preference
techniques’.  This has become a popular term, largely because of the clear contrast it
portrays to ‘revealed preference techniques’.  Steer and Willumsen (1981) and
9Sheldon and Steer (1982) provide some of the earliest publications outlining the use
of the technique within the transport sector.
Prior to 1983, the emphasis of stated preference techniques had been on judgmental
tasks, in which respondents were asked to rank or rate a number of attribute mixes
associated with a particular choice context.   However, it was not until the
publication of a paper by Louviere and Hensher (1983) that stated preference
techniques became better known.  Louviere and Hensher’s paper emphasised the
use of stated preference experiments, which incorporated choice experiments.  The
data produced from this kind of survey proved far easier to analyse, and allowed
greater prediction of market shares.  Figure 1 shows an example of a simple choice
card that might be presented to a respondent.
Figure 1: An example of a choice card
¨ Definitely choose A
¨ Probably choose A
¨ No preference between A or B
 ¨ Definitely choose B
¨ Probably choose B
Choice-based stated preference techniques are now considered the most commonly
used technique (Pearmain et al, 1991).
Whilst the techniques grew in their usage, economists remained sceptical about the
reliance upon respondents’ ‘stated intentions’, rather than actual behaviour
(Hensher, 1992).  However, stated preference techniques performed impressively
when compared to revealed preference data as part of the UK Department of
Transport Value of Time Project (MVA, ITS, TSO, 1987).  This study resulted in the
OPTION A
Travel by bus
Journey time is 25 mins
Bus Fare is 90p
OPTION B
Travel by car
Journey time is 15 mins
Petrol and parking costs
are £1.50
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acceptance of the method by the Department of Transport.  This influential
acceptance has resulted in a significant increase in the frequency of the method’s
usage in the UK.
Difficulties in the Design of SP Experiments
Whilst the estimates produced from SP data in the Department of Transport’s value
of time study (discussed above) were considered to perform well when compared
with revealed preference data, the technique has experienced some problems.  For
example, it has been reported that the traffic forecasts for the high speed rail link
between London and the channel tunnel were inaccurate (Financial Times, 18.4.98).
The underlying problem with the design and/or analysis of the SP surveys on
which the forecasts were based remains unresolved.
Whilst the use of stated preference techniques have become widespread, there
remains a lack of understanding about how individuals make their choices during
the experiment.  The design and analysis of SP experiments are based upon a
number of assumptions about the way people make these decisions. These
assumptions originate from the economic theory in which the technique developed.
In 1995 Ampt et al. compared the current economics-based beliefs and assumptions
made about stated preference techniques, with findings about choice behaviour
found in the field of psychology.  They suggest that the assumptions currently made
by SP researchers may be invalid as a result of information screening and alternative
choice strategies employed by the respondent (to be discussed further later in this
paper).  More recently, Swanson (1998) has again called for more SP researchers to
pay more attention to the findings in the psychology literature.
One aspect of SP design that is not understood is the apparent difference in
responses produced when attributes are represented in alternative forms.  This is an
area that is becoming increasingly important as technological advances allow greater
freedom in the surveying process.  The use of lap top computers allow text, picture
and potentially video and sound to represent attributes. Nelson and Towriss (1995)
describe a study that looks at the difference between verbal (text) and visual
representations of attributes in research that focused upon the demand for light rail
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transit (LRT) in Manchester.  This study found that responses differed depending
upon the type of representations used.  Follow up interviews with the respondents
led the authors to tentatively suggest that ‘some individuals find it difficult to make
choices based on the abstract nature of attributes represented in a textual form and seek to
add realism by embellishing the information given to them in the experimental setting’.
The research by Nelson and Towriss (1995) has been important in highlighting the
difference that alternative methods of representation can make in SP data. It does
not however provide a detailed discussion of the possible underlying reasons for the
differences in responses. This paper draws on findings within the field of
psychology, and presents a theoretical model of decision making that explains the
differences in responses made to different attribute representations.  The remainder
of this paper discusses the assumptions made about the decision making process by
stated preference researchers, and discusses the economic origins of these
assumptions, before contrasting them with evidence from the psychology literature.
Finally a theoretical model of decision making within stated preference experiments
is presented.
3.  Alternative Theories of Decision Making
Consumer choice behaviour has attracted a wealth of research attention – in
particular within the fields of psychology and economics and within the applied
fields of marketing, and advertising research.  This section aims to draw on this
literature in order to explain the theoretical background to the model of decision
making suggested at the end of this paper.
Consumer Decision Making in Stated Preference Techniques
In this section it is useful to provide an overview of the theory and assumptions adopted by
stated preference practitioners.  Firstly the underlying components of consumer behaviour will
be described.  The model discussed is taken from ‘Stated Preference Techniques – A Guide to
Practice’ by Pearmain et al. (1991), the leading text in the field of stated preference techniques
within the transport field.  Secondly the assumptions made by stated preference practitioners
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about the way in which information is used in the choice process will be discussed.  Lastly,
criticisms of the assumptions made in stated preference surveying will be outlined and
compared with similar criticisms made about economic modelling in general.  Some of the
concepts introduced in this section relate to theories discussed later in the paper.  The author
feels that it is important to describe the assumed decision making within the context of stated
preference techniques first however, before discussing the underlying concepts and theories in
more detail in the paper.
Pearmain et al. (1991) in their widely referenced text ‘Stated Preference Techniques – A Guide
to Practice’ provide a model of decision making that depicts the ‘the main processes
underlying travel behaviour’.  This model is depicted in figure 2 on the following page.
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Figure 2: Components of Consumer Behaviour (Pearmain et al., 1991)
The diagram distinguishes between elements that are external to the consumer (and therefore
observable) and those that are internal to the consumer (and therefore unobservable). External,
observable elements are those such as the attributes of travel alternatives. Internal,
unobservable elements are those such as the perceptions and preferences of the consumer. ‘The
former serve to promote and constrain market behaviour, the latter reflect consumer’s
understanding of their options and influence their decisions to pursue particular strategies’
(Pearmain et al., 1991).  Pearmain et al. suggest that by using quantitative methods such as
stated preference techniques, researchers can infer ‘data on preferences (liking or disliking for
each option) and behavioural intentions (what the person would intend to do)’.
The ‘Pearmain’ model described above clearly contains a chain of internal mental elements
(perception ®  attitudes ®  preferences ®  behavioural intentions) that are linked to the multiple
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attributes of alternative travel options. This description of the decision making process relates
closely to Fishbein’s theory of decision making (that is discussed later in the paper).
Stated preference practitioners make a number of assumptions about the way in
which respondents choose in SP surveys:
· Stated preference techniques rely upon the concept of utility.  ‘Stated preference
techniques use individual respondents’ statements about their preferences in a set of
options to estimate utility functions’ (Pearmain et al., 1991).  The concept of utility
will be discussed in detail in section 2.3.
· Respondents are assumed to act rationally – that is using a utility maximising
choice strategy.  This means that the respondents are believed to attach utility
weightings to each of the attributes in a choice situation.  It is assumed that the
option with the highest total utility will therefore be chosen.  Responses by
individual’s within a stated preference survey that appear to the researcher to be
‘irrational’ (non-utility maximising) are traditionally removed from the sample
· The attributes included within the survey are assumed to exhaust the
respondent’s salient beliefs about the object in the survey.  It is assumed therefore
that the information set on which decisions are made are those represented by
the researcher in the survey only.  The exception exists where a researcher
includes attributes that are not believed to be salient, because these are variables
that the researcher want to value.
Kroes and Sheldon (1988) suggest that ‘An interesting feature of stated preference
techniques is that they are particularly well suited by their experimental nature for testing
alternative hypotheses about the functional form of the utility function’.  This is supported
by Louviere (1978).   However, stated preference practitioners almost without
exceptions assume a utility function that is linear and additive.  A typical linear
additive utility function is as follows:
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UI = a0 + a1X1 + a2X2…  +anXn
Where,U = utility of option I
X1… .Xn = product attributes
a1… ...an = model coefficients
a0 = model constant
The model coefficients represent the relative importance to each product attribute.
The functional form of this typically assumed utility function is compensatory.  It
assumes that individuals trade-off an improvement in one attribute against a
worsening in another.
The Use of Assumptions within Stated Preference Research
Ampt et al. (1995) questions the realism of the assumptions used in stated
preference techniques.  This kind of criticism has previously been discussed at
length about economic theory in general.  Blaug (1980) suggests that ‘realistic’
assumptions in the social sciences can be considered as ‘motives to economic actors that
we, fellow human beings, find comprehensible’. Blaug states that the Verstehen doctrine
tells us that this is a ‘desideratum of adequate theorizing in the social sciences’.  Friedman
(1953) in his ‘Essay on the Methodology of Positive Economics’, when discussing the
‘maximization of returns hypothesis’ suggests that ‘individuals behave as-if they were
seeking rationally to maximise their expected returns…  and have full knowledge of the data
needed to succeed in this attempt’.  Blaug (1980) compares this with the hypothesis that
‘billiards players calculate the angle of the momentum of billiards balls every time they drive
the ball into a pocket’.  The billiards player may act in a way that suggests that this
calculation occurs - this does not mean that this process does actually occur.
Theories are only instruments for making predictions or, better still, inference tickets
that warrant the predictions that we make (Coddington, 1972: Blaug, 1980).  This
author accepts the suggestion by Friedman that the assumptions that are made
about behaviour do not need to be realistic, so long as they allow accurate
predictions.  However, as discussed in the introduction to the research area, stated
preference techniques have not always been accurate in their predictions (an
accurate model is here considered to be one that outperforms a null or random
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model – see Swanson, 1998).  This suggests that the assumptions underlying stated
preference techniques should, as Ampt et al. (1995) suggests, be questioned.  The
assumptions about the use of information will be considered in the following
section.
Stated Preference Techniques and the Underlying Theory
Consumer decision making has attracted a lot of research attention in the fields of
psychology and economics.  Stated preference techniques have originated from the
field of economics, and it easy to see the influence of this discipline upon the
assumptions made about the use of stated preference techniques.  However, as
already stated, the model presented by Pearmain et al. (1991) also suggests the
influence of Fishbein’s theory of decision making - that originates from the field of
psychology.  The following sections describe consumer research within the two
fields, and discusses the implications for the assumptions made about stated
preference techniques.  The contrast between the predominant paradigms, and
assumptions within the fields of psychology and economics are depicted overleaf in
figure 3.
Contrasting Paradigms in Psychology
Within the field of psychology, there are two contrasting paradigms that have
dominated research within the area of consumer decision making during this
century.  This section describes these two paradigms and criticisms made about
them both.
The early years of this century saw the emergence of behaviourism as a reaction
against earlier cognitive models of behaviour.  Behaviourists’ consider action to
result from reflexes to external stimuli (Pavlov, 1927; Watson, 1930; Skinner, 1938).
They consider the role of the mind as secondary, or even irrelevant to explaining
behaviour.  Foxall (1987) suggests that the behaviourist paradigm is comprised of
three separate elements:
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· Operant conditioning, in which environmental factors influence the rate at which
behaviour occurs;
· A single-subject research strategy, which proceeds inductively through the intensive
study of individuals rather than through the testing of deductive hypotheses by
means of inter-group statistical comparisons;
· A philosophical stance that explains behaviour by reference to contingent
environmental stimuli, eschewing causal reference to intrapersonal factors.
Skinner (1950) suggests that to explain behaviour, the environmental factors that
affect the rate at which behavioural responses occur must be identified.  These
environmental factors are considered to condition human behaviour.
In stark contrast to the assumptions held within the behaviourist paradigm, the
second half of the century experienced the re-establishment of cognitive psychology.
Cognitive psychologists believe that elements inside the mind are causal in directing
human behaviour – mediating between the stimuli of the environment and the
behaviour of the individual (Sheerer, 1954).  Modern cognitive psychology
developed from:
· Chomsky (1959) working in the area of language and memory
· Traditions of ‘verbal learning’ stemming from Ebbinghaus’ study of human
memory (Howes, 1990)
· The model of information processing that emerged during the 1960s alongside
that of the computer programming (Howes, 1990).
Cognitivist models of consumer decision making will be discussed in more detail in
the following section.
The cognitivist paradigm has not existed without criticism.  Foxall (1987) highlights
the following criticisms:
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· The comprehensive models of consumer decision making have been extensive
criticised, notably in view of the untestable nature of their propositions (Bagozzi,
1984; Jacoby, 1978; Tuck, 1976).
· Empirical research has revealed low correlational consistency between measures of
the central pre-behavioural components of the models derived within this paradigm
and that of the pre-purchase choice behaviour itself (Azjen and Fishbein, 1977;
Fishbein, 1981; Foxall, 1983; Wicker, 1969).
· Consumers have been shown to make smaller and less rational use of information
than the cognitivist information-processing paradigm.
The re-emergence of the cognitive paradigm in psychology, and its displacement of
behaviourism as the prevailing philosophy is now widely recognised by
psychologists (Foxall, 1983, 1987).  Criticisms such as those described above have
not significantly weakened the adoption of the paradigm within the field. Foxall
(1987) suggests that this unrivalled acceptance of a paradigm that is dependent
upon untestable, unobservable mental elements is unhealthy for the future scientific
advances in the field of consumer behaviour.  He calls for a greater evaluation of the
cognitivist paradigm’s underlying assumptions.  Foxall is one of the most prominent
proponents for the re-examination of the behaviourist paradigm within the field of
consumer behaviour.  However his focus on the behaviourist perspective is argued
more to encourage greater evaluation of the cognitivist assumptions in order to
strengthen rather than undermine this dominant paradigm.
It is true that there exist many criticisms of the cognivitist paradigm (in particular
those relating to the untestability of the internal mental elements on which the
paradigm rests).  However, there exists no criticism to date that has achieved to
undermine the paradigm significantly, and it therefore remains the dominant
framework within the field.  This author therefore adopts this cognitivist paradigm.
Cognitivist Models of Consumer Decision Making
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Prescriptive accounts of consumer research and marketing management emphasise
strongly the need to identify and measure consumers’ pre-purchase cognitive
processes (for example, Kotler, 1980; Engel et al., 1978).  It is argued that by
understanding these processes, ‘effective persuasion of the buyer’s pre-purchase
processing of information, gained significantly though not exclusively through advertising,
strengthens or modifies changes in his buying behaviour, particularly brand choice’ (Foxall,
1983).
Information processing models of consumer behaviour have prevailed in the study
of these pre-purchase mental events since they first appeared in the 1960s.  These
models can be likened to computer flow charts, and follow a process of pre-purchase
mental events and processes.  Table 1 below provides a summary of some of the
most well known of these models.
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Table 1:
Information Processing Models of Consumer Choice (Adapted from Foxall, 1983; Tuck,
1976)
Author (s) Year Sequence
Lionberger
Rogers
1960
1962
Seeing Þ  Reading Þ  Believing Þ  Remembering Þ  Acting
Colley 1961 Unawareness Þ  Awareness Þ  Comprehension Þ
Conviction Þ Action
Lavidge and Steiner 1961 Awareness Þ  Knowledge Þ  Liking Þ  Preference Þ
Conviction Þ  Action
Niscosia 1968 See appendix A for flow chart
McGuire 1969 Exposure Þ  Attention Þ  Comprehension Þ  Conviction
Þ  Action
Howard and Sheth 1969 Attention Þ  Brand Comprehension Þ  Attitude Þ
Intention Þ  Purchase
Engel, Kollat and
Blackwell
1970 See appendix B for flow chart
Rogers and
Shoemaker
1971 Knowledge Þ  Persuasion Þ  Decision Þ  Confirmation
McGuire 1976
Exposure Þ  Perception Þ  Comprehension Þ  Agreement
Þ  Retention Þ  Retrieval Þ  Decision Making Þ  Action
Engel, Blackwell and
Kollat
1978 Perceived Information Þ  Problem Recognition Þ  Search
Þ  Evaluation of Alternatives Þ  Beliefs Þ  Attitudes Þ
Intentions Þ  Choice
Britt 1978 Exposing Þ  Attending Þ  Perceiving Þ  Learning and
Remembering Þ  Motivating Þ  Persuading Þ  Desired
Action
Whilst these flow charts dominated the output of the academic consumer behaviour
theorists in the 1960s and 1970s, they were not without criticism.  Tuck (1976) states
that the models of Nicosia, Engel, Kollat, and Blackwell, and Howard and Sheth
‘suffer from untestability and lack of specifity of variables.  They offer models of what
consumer choice might be like, but offer no evidence that it is in fact like their theories’.  The
criticisms that Tuck makes about these three models are essentially true for all the
models included with table 2.1.2.  The relationships between the variables were not
clearly defined and could not easily be tested empirically.  As discussed earlier in
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the previous section, these criticisms relate largely to the cognitive philosophical
stance that these models adopt.  By accepting the existence of internal mental
processes in the act of making a decision, these models immediately introduce the
difficulties of variable measurement.  However whilst these criticisms are strong,
there remains an almost universal acceptance amongst consumer research that pre-
purchase mental events do exist.  As a result, different forms of these information
processing models still prevail in current consumer behaviour texts (for example,
see Solomon, 1996).
A consumer’s overall evaluation of a product or service accounts for the bulk of
his/her attitude towards it.  Therefore when a market researcher wants to assess
attitudes, it can be sometimes sufficient to ask a simple question such as: ‘how do you
feel about travelling by train?’.  However, one problem is that a product or service is
commonly made up of a number attributes, some of which may be more important
than others to different people.  For this reason multi-attribute models have become
extremely popular amongst market researchers.
Recently, models of consumer decision making (in particular multi-attribute models)
have relied more and more heavily on the ‘functional theory of attitudes’ to explain
how attitudes facilitate behaviour (Katz, 1960).  Roberts (1987) defines an attitude as
a general evaluation of people, object or issues.
Martin Fishbein (1983) developed the most influential attitude model.  The model
measures the following three components of attitude:
· Salient beliefs people have about an Ao (i.e. those beliefs about the object that are
considered during evaluation).
· Object-Attribute linkages, or the probability that salient beliefs are held about a
particular object.
· Evaluation of each of the salient beliefs.
Problems with the predictive ability of attitude models to predict behaviour led to an
extended Fishbein model, the ‘theory of reasoned action’ (Azjen and Fishbein, 1977).
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The theory recognises the power of other people in influencing behaviour by
including the following variables:
· Normative Belief  - that others believe an action should be taken or not taken.
· The motivation to comply with the belief – the degree to which the consumer takes
others’ anticipated reactions into account when evaluating a course of action or a
purchase.
Models of decision making have been extended within the decision-making
literature to include other factors affecting individual’s beliefs, attitudes and
intentions.  For example:
· Social influence:  The extended Fishbein model can be seen to include a variable that
accounts for the effects of social influence on an individual’s decision.  Research
within the field of psychology has deepened the understanding of this influence
through the investigation of the following factors: conformity; obedience; leadership;
and collective behaviour (see McIlveen and Gross, 1988).
· Cognitive dissonance: This has been an area researched primarily within the
marketing context.  It relates to a consumer’s post-rationalisation of their behaviour.
A consumer believes that a product has additional utility after its purchase in a way
of justifying previous behaviour (see Foxall, 1990).
The above points are examples of factors (other then a product’s attributes) that
affect the attitudes, beliefs and intentions of a consumer about a product or service.
Research into these areas has been important in understanding the variables that
affect attitudes.  Stated preference research however, does not attempt to measure
these factors separately.  SP research aims to measure the intentions of individuals
about products and services.  Their attitudes (which include measures of the
variables discussed above) are implicit within this measure.
Consumer Decision Making in Economics
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Models of consumer decision making in the field of economics are based upon the
principles of instrumental or substantive rationality, and utility maximisation.  It is
also upon these principles that stated preference techniques rest.  This section will
describe these concepts.
Instrumental rationality is defined as the choice of actions that best satisfy a person’s
objectives (Hargreaves Heap et al., 1992).  This presumes that an individual with a
variety of objectives is capable of comparing the satisfaction of these various
objectives so as to come to an overall assessment.  It has traditionally been assumed
that these objectives can be ordered on a single scale by comparing the pleasures of
satisfying them.  The name given to this measure is ‘utility’.
The concept of utility is rooted in the philosophy of utilitarianism (Bentham, 1789;
Mill, 1863; Pigou, 1920: Hargreaves Heap, 1992), although the concept of
instrumental rationality is now expressed in a slightly different way.  It is assumed
that individuals have preferences, and that the integration of these preferences is
revealed in a preference ordering which determines action.  Instrumentally rational
action is defined through placing certain restrictions on these orderings (axioms of
rationality).  When these restrictions are met, the preference ordering can be
represented by a utility function (Hargreaves Heap et al., 1992).
It is upon the above assumptions that microeconomists base the theory of consumer
choice.  Katz and Rosen (1991) suggest that there are three main steps involved in
understanding consumer behaviour:
1. We must know what the consumer wants to do: that is we need to know his/her
preferences for various commodities.  Without knowing her preferences, we cannot
know what a ‘good’ solution to the problem of scarcity is from his/her own point of
view.  Thus the first step in modelling consumer behaviour is representing
consumer tastes.
2. We also need to know what the individual can do, given his/her income and the
prices he/she faces.  Hence the second step is modelling the constraints facing the
decision-maker due to her limited budget.
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3. The third step is simply putting the consumer’s preferences together with his/her
constraints.  This allows us to determine which feasible choice maximises his/her
well being.
Rational decisions are therefore, decisions that maximise utility, given particular
consumer tastes and preferences. The key to predicting future consumer behaviour,
is understanding/evaluating those tastes/preferences within their constraints.
The overall approach taken in understanding consumer behaviour has varied
greatly in terms of the models produced between the field of economics and
psychology.  However the economic and psychological models described are not
necessarily incompatible with each other.  For example, the Fishbein model does not
prohibit the concept of utility maximising behaviour (as can be seen in the Pearmain
model presented earlier in this paper).  The main contrast between the two
disciplines can be seen in their understanding of the term ‘rational behaviour’.  This
will be discussed in the next section.
The Contrast between Psychology and Economics – The Use of Information
There is an important difference in the conceptualisation of the term ‘rationality’
between economists and psychologists.  ‘In economics, rationality is viewed in terms of
the choices it produces; in the other social sciences it is viewed in terms of the processes it
employs’ (Simon, 1976, 1982).  ‘The rationality of economics is substantive rationality,
while the rationality of psychology is procedural rationality’ (Simon, 1986).
The way in which these different concepts of rationality are described within the
economics and psychology literature can be viewed in terms of the different
assumptions that are made about the information set used in the decision making
process.  Instrumental or substantive rationality (or economic rationality) assumes a
full information set.  Procedural rationality assumes that choices may be based upon
a distorted information set, as a result of different mental elements that process the
information.  The following sections examine the effects of these mental processes
and how they might affect the information set.
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Exposure to Information
The theoretical difficulty with instrumental rationality arises firstly over the
informational structure of decisions made (Hargreaves Heap (1992)) - that is the
availability or cost of information on which decisions are made.  The problem may
not be obvious at first, because it is tempting to think that the investment in
acquiring information can be subjected to an instrumental calculation.  For example,
economists suggest that individuals invest in information up to the point at which
marginal benefit in terms of additional utility, matches the marginal cost in terms of
utility that might have been gained from other activities undertaken instead.
However, Hargreaves Heap et al (1992) ask ‘How is an individual to know the
marginal benefits of further information acquisition, without knowledge of the full
information set?’.  They state that whilst it is possible to suggest that an individual
has subjective beliefs about the benefits from additional information, this introduces
an arbitrary element into the description of action.
The way in which people’s choices are limited by the information that they gather
has serious implications for the use of stated preference surveys.  In stated
preference surveys respondents are provided with all the information that is
required to make a utility maximising decision.  In reality the cost or availability of
information may limit their instrumental rationality.
It is also possible that respondents may not utilise information that is available to
them at no, or limited cost.  The use of available information can be affected greatly
depending upon the type of decision being made.  Two different variables will now
be considered, the frequency of the decision made, and the level of consumer
involvement.
The frequency of the decision being made can affect the level of information search
that is carried out by a consumer.  For example, recent research by Verplanken et al
(1998) suggests that habitual behaviour causes the information search carried out by
the consumer to be limited, therefore distorting the information set on which
decisions are made.  Instumentally rational action (and hence stated preference
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techniques) assumes that behaviour is dependent upon a discrete decision, which is
considered upon all available information.  Verplanken et al (1988) suggest that
when behaviour is ‘repeatedly and satisfactorily executed and becomes habitual, it may lose
its reasoned action’.
Recently, substantial research attention within the field of marketing has been given
to another aspect of the decision making process: the level of involvement that the
consumer feels with the product as he/she makes a decision. Foxall (1993) suggests
that the level of consumer involvement can affect the level of motivation to
participate in the full information processing sequence (an instrumentally rational
process).  He states that the level of consumer involvement relies on a product’s
complexity, risk, and cost.  An example of a product that typically exhibits high
consumer involvement is that of the purchase of a car.  In contrast the purchase of
baked beans for example, is usually considered a low involvement decision.
Therefore the level of consumer involvement can be seen to directly affect the
information set on which a decision is made.
The information set used by an individual in a decision can clearly affect the
assumption of instrumental rationality.  Further factors affecting the information set
used by respondents in stated preference surveys will be discussed later in the
subsequent sections (perception, comprehension and information retrieval, the
choice strategy employed)
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Perception
McGuire (1978) describes perception in terms of attention levels, sensory modality, and
selective perception.
Attention levels have received a great deal of attention within the advertising
literature (for example Moray, 1969; Mackworth, 1970; Kahneman, 1973; Bogart,
1983; Krugman, 1988).  However these papers relate to how long an advertisement
can keep an individual’s attention, and for how long this information will be
retained.  In a stated preference experiment, the researcher is not interested in how
long the information will be retained.  Furthermore, most stated preference research
is carried out as an interview, and so the attention of the individual to the choices
presented can be ensured.  Within the context of stated preference surveying
therefore we can assume that the respondent’s attention to the information provided
is maintained.
Literature relating to sensory modality examines how different modes of
information are perceived - for example information conveyed by the eye or the ear
(McGuire, 1978; Cornsweet, 1970).  This research however focuses on how different
modalities affect attention levels, and not comprehension of the information.
McGuire (1978) suggests that individuals implement selective perception in order to
deal with the problem of sensory overload.  McGuire suggests seven different
strategies employed by individuals that result in our perceiving a subset of all the
information that reaches our receptors:
· Lumping or chunking - for example, instead of seeing a group of trees, we see a forest.
· Shifts in perception – where an individual shifts their perception between one and
another part of a scene.
· Temporary storage – temporary storage of information in the short term memory
allows an individual to part the present information into some kind of ‘pushdown’
list so that the information can be dealt with at a less hectic moment.
· Distribution of attention – less sharply but more broadly, or alternate between sharp
and broad attention.
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· Parallel processing – allowing an individual to attend to materials in two different
modalities simultaneously.
· Not a zero-sum game – cognitive capacity can be drawn from other activities at
moments of need and concentrate it more completely on perception of the current
sensory information.
· Selectivity – perceiving some aspects of the current sensory information while
ignoring others.
The area of selective perception is approached by Timmermans (1993).  Increasing
the task complexity (determined by the number of alternatives and the number of
attributes) in a multi-attribute decision experiment caused respondents to
implement screening processes to the information presented to them.  Payne et al.
(1992) who suggests that the number of alternatives in a choice produces the
greatest affect to information screening supports this study.
The way in which different ways of representing information affects perceptive
selectivity has attracted little research attention.  However within the advertising
literature, Edell and Staelin (1983) suggest that ‘pictures interact with words to produce
effects that are significantly greater than words alone’.
The way in which information is perceived can clearly affect the information set on
which decisions are made.  The above example by Timmermans (1993) shows how
selective perception can reduce the information set significantly.  Research to date
has failed to provide evidence of whether different forms of representing attributes
affects the ability of individuals to perceive information fully (that is without
limiting the information set on which decisions are made).  As already discussed
this has far reaching implications for the assumption of instrumental rationality.
Comprehension and Information Retrieval
Comprehension of information is closely linked with information search and
retrieval.  Assuming that an individual has perceived the information presented to
them fully, this information is encoded or abstracted.  Encoding refers to the process of
information storing which is believed to be undertaken (Howes, 1990).  In the
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encoding process information received is related to previous information stored.
Comprehension of new information is therefore related to previous
knowledge/beliefs and attitudes towards subjects.  This is supported by Nelson and
Towriss (1995) who, as described earlier in this paper, found in follow up interviews
to their original research, that individuals tended to embellish information provided
in stated preference surveys using previous experiences.  They found that this
occurred in particular with verbal stimuli.
Evidence of respondents retrieving information can be found in the advertising
literature.  Figure 3 shows a Benetton advertisement published in 1989 in the United
States.  This advertising campaign produced an outcry from the general public
because the photograph was perceived as portraying a black prisoner handcuffed to
a white police officer (New York Times, November 20th, 1989).  Even though both
men are dressed the same, people’s prior assumptions distorted the advertisement’s
meaning.
Figure 3: Benetton Advertisment from the US
Source: New York Times, November 20th 1989
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Use of stored information, or embellishment of information provided within a stated
preference survey, results in the distortion of the information set on which decisions
are made.  If respondents base their decisions not only on the information provided
in the stated preference survey, but also on previously stored information, this
suggests that the attributes included within the survey do not exhaust a
respondent’s salient beliefs.  This can lead to inaccuracies in the weightings that
consumers are estimated to make about the different attributes being investigated.
.
Choice Strategies
The key to the alternative theory of rationality, the procedural theory, is that
individuals use ‘rules of thumb’ - simple procedures - to guide their actions.  Simon
(1978) treats the use of such procedures as short-cut devices for an individual’s
decision-making.  In 1990 Simon summarised that ‘because of the limits of their
computing speeds and power, intelligent systems must use approximate methods to handle
most tasks.  Their rationality is ‘bounded’. For example, Hargreaves Heap et al (1992)
suggest an individual may use adaptive expectations, a simple examination of the
past to determine the future, rather than collect all the information which might
allow the formation of a rational expectation.  Similarly, an individual who is
deciding on which investment projects to undertake may use a simple rule of
thumb.  For example an individual may ‘undertake any project with a payback period of
less than three years’, rather than carry out a strict ranking of projects according to the
present discounted value of their expected profits’.  Simon suggests that procedural
rationality is really an artificial form of instrumental rationality.  Individuals still
wish to maximise their utility.  However their rationality has become bounded
because they are not fully informed – in these circumstances, people settle for
satisficing rather than optimising.
The existence of bounded rationality has resulted in decision processes which do not
conform to the utility maximising compensatory processes which are assumed
within most stated preferences exercises.  A number of alternative decision making
strategies, based on the heuristic search paradigm, are provided by Ampt et al.
(1995):
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· Dominance-based choice processes are those where people select an option which is
valued higher than all other alternatives on each attribute.  For example, alternative
a is valued higher in terms of each of its attributes (cost, time, comfort) than
competing alternative b.  This will not in general produce a single solution of course.
 
· Von Neuman and Morgentern (1947) postulated the maximax and maximin choice
strategies in game theory.  People who use a maximin choice strategy identify the
least satisfactory attribute of each alternative and then choose the alternative that
has the highest minimum level of satisfaction.  People using a maximax strategy
choose the highest maximum level of satisfaction from the most satisfactory
attributes of each alternative.
 
· Lexicographic choice strategies are those used when a person hierarchically orders all
attributes of the choices they are about to make and then chooses the alternative
with the highest value on the most important attribute.  Here again, travel
behaviour choices of this type are easy to find, e.g. the person for whom travel time
is critical and who will choose the quickest journey of all other attributes.
 
· Conjunctive choice strategies are those made when a person rejects any alternative that
fails to meet anyone of the minimum criterion of acceptability.  This means that the
individual sets an acceptable level for each attribute and rejects any alternative
where the level/levels are not met.  Conversely, disjunctive choice strategies result in
the acceptance of any alternative exceeding a certain criterion.  Again this will not
always give a single solution.
The choice strategy employed by a respondent in a stated preference survey affects
the information set on which decisions are based (in a similar way to which selective
perception affects the information set).  As already discussed this can damage the
assumption of instrumental rationality.
4.  Deriving A Theoretical Model of Decision Making in SP
There has been a growing use of pictures to represent attributes in stated preference
experiments.  Nelson and Towriss (1995) have reported that the form used to
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represent attributes in an SP experiment (verbal or visual) affects the responses
made by individuals. Figure 4 on the following page depicts an alternative model of
decision-making in stated preference techniques to explain this phenomenon.  It
adopts the information processing, cognitive approach that has dominated the
psychology literature for most of this century, and continues today.
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As discussed earlier in this paper, Nelson and Towriss (1995) suggested tentatively
that greater embellishment (use of stored information) might occur when attributes
in SP are presented to the respondent verbally.  This may explain the difference in
responses.  This author therefore suggests that the representation of attributes can
affect the information set on which decisions are made (this relationship is shown in
figure 4 as a white arrow connecting the two elements).
Literature within the psychology field, stemming from Simon’s 1955 concept of
bounded rationality suggests that increasing the size of the information set on which
decisions are made results in simplifying ‘rules of thumb’ (or non-utility maximising
choice strategies). More recently, research carried out by Timmermans (1993)
supports this, by showing that increasing task complexity alters the choice strategy
of respondents.  Hence figure 4 shows another purple arrow linking the information
set and choice strategy used by a respondent.
The use of alternative choice strategies to that of the utility maximising assumption
by SP practitioners has significant affects on the information choice set – that is the
information on which the final evaluation/decision is actually based.  These
alternative choice strategies produce a kind of screening affect on the original
Representation of
Attributes
Information Set
Choice Strategy
SP Response
Research Question 1:
Does the way in which attributes
are represented (verbal or visual)
alter the information set on
which
decisions are made?
Research Question 2:
Does the information set on
which
 decision are made affect the
choice
Information
Choice Set
Figure 4:THE AFFECT OF
DIFFERENT FORMS OF
REPRESENTATION ON SP
RESPONSES
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information set, reducing the information on which the final decision is made.  The
relationship between the choice strategy and the information choice set is depicted
as a black arrow linking the two elements.
The information contained within the information choice set is that upon which an
individual choice is finally made.  It is these factors that ought to be included as
explanatory variables within any model based upon these choices.  Given the
possible inclusion of stored information (as discussed above) within the information
choice set, it is possible that these factors could be those not included within the
survey itself.  The relationship between the information choice set and the response
made by the individual in the SP experiment is again depicted as a black arrow in
figure 4.
The arrows shown in figure 4 as black are considered by this author to have been
tested previously in a stated preference context (that is in the context of hypothetical
choice making).  The arrows shown in purple represent relationships that have been
inferred by existing evidence in the decision making field, but are as yet untested in
the context of stated preference exercises.  These relationships are therefore marked
in figure 4 with possible research questions, which could be used in order to test this
model.  This author believes that the testing of this model is important for the
further improvement and development of the use of stated preference techniques.
Conclusion
This paper has provided an historical background to stated preference techniques,
from its origins in the field of experimental economics.  Their origins were shown to
influence significantly the assumptions that are made by stated preference
practitioners today.  The contrasting evidence to those assumptions, in existence in
the field of psychology has been described in detail.  This evidence has formed the
theoretical basis for the alternative model of decision making in stated preference
experiments made in the previous section.  This model is presented as an
information processing chain of internal mental events (the affect of attribute
representation on the information set, and so on the choice strategy employed, the
information choice set, and thus the final stated response.   If this model proves to
be reliable (through future testing) this has serious implications for the design and
analysis of stated preference surveying (which are currently based upon the
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assumptions of economic rationality and utility maximisation). This author therefore
strongly supports further research in this area.
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